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Introduction
The experimental literature provides ample evidence on the heterogeneity of individual preferences. Findings from dictator games, ultimatum games, giftexchange games, trust games and prisoner dilemmas led to the discovery of various forms of (distribution-based and/or intention-based) social preferences and, among others, of (positive and negative) reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) , inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) , other-regarding preferences (Cox, 2004) , mixed-preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) , betrayal aversion , guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009 ) and various forms of pure and impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990) .
In this paper we argue that, when investigating other-regarding preferences, information from choices revealed in incentivized lab experiments may be usefully complemented by a parallel analysis on the levels of self-reported satisfaction of experiment participants. More specifically, an investigation on selfreported satisfaction about one's own and other players' behavior in the experiment, and about the experiment itself, may be crucial to provide further information and shed light on the characteristics of players' heterogeneous preferences.
We apply the approach combining experimental results with self-reported satisfaction about experiment circumstances to an original hybrid contribution prisoner's dilemma called 'Vote-with-the-Wallet Game' (VWG henceforth) which reproduces the typical dilemma that a consumer faces more and more frequently today when choosing between a product which is advertised as socially and/or environmentally responsible and a conventional product. We reproduce the typical trade-o↵ implied by this choice by conveniently assuming that the responsible product costs more but its purchase produces a positive externality (also for consumers buying the standard product) in terms of corporate environmental and social responsibility, in proportion to the share of consumers making the same choice. Given these characteristics the prisoner's dilemma arises because the Nash equilibrium in which everyone finds it optimal to choose the conventional product is Pareto dominated by that in which everyone chooses the responsible product.
Our paper documents that the combination of the two sources of information (experimental findings and data on declared satisfaction) may provide additional relevant knowledge on preferences.
While in a companion paper document a decay in the share of responsible buyers across rounds in the repeated version of the game, we illustrate here that 'strong cooperators' (participants with a share of cooperative choices above median in the experiment) -di↵erently from what happens for cooperators below median -are more satisfied about the game (and about their own behavior in the game) if the share of their cooperative choices is higher (even when the latter reduces their own monetary payo↵s). In addition to it, we show that their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively a↵ected by their own cooperative behavior and by the non cooperative behavior of the other players.
The combination of findings from self-reported satisfaction and experimental choices in our paper provides clear support for the presence of heterogeneity of preferences. As well, it is consistent with the hypothesis that experiment participants have other-regarding preferences and reciprocal concerns with heterogeneous weights.
The paper presents six sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the second section, we briefly sketch the theoretical framework that motivated the original VWG experiment outlining its hybrid prisoner's dilemma characteristics and documenting its relevance in the current economic scenario. In the third section, we describe the experimental design and briefly comment its results. In the fourth section, we present findings on satisfaction about the experiment. In the fifth section, we broaden our original theoretical framework by introducing three innovations (heterogeneous other-regarding preferences and reciprocity arguments plus expectations on other players' behavior) which allow us to reproduce our empirical findings. The sixth section concludes.
The theoretical framework of the VWG
In keeping with Becchetti and Salustri (2015), we consider the player's utility -contingent on the choice of voting either for the responsible product (vR) or for the conventional product (vC) -in the basic two-player version of the VWG and write it as
with the strategy profile being represented by S :
The voting choice corresponding to the (vR) strategy pushes corporations towards a more socially, environmentally and fiscally responsible attitude.
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The externality coming up from such a choice is measured by the parameter 2 [0, +1), while the intensity of its e↵ect is related to the share of players choosing the responsible product. The parameter ↵ 2 [0, +1) measures the positive e↵ect generated when the strategy (vR) is in place, in case of players' nonzero otherregarding preferences. The cost di↵erential between purchasing the SR product and its equivalent non SR alternative -in other terms, between the vR / vC strategy -is measured by 2 [0, +1). Additionally, no income constraint is assumed for simplicity (or, alternatively, only non income constrained players may participate to the VWG). show that the unique NE of the game is (vC, vC) if When moving to the multiplayer version of the game, we have n > 2,
. . , n}, and S i = {vR, vC} for each i 2 N . As a consequence, the payo↵ function becomes
with j indicating the number of players voting with the vR strategy in S ( i) . The unique NE of the multiplayer game is (vC, vC), when 1 n + ↵ < , and (vR, vR) otherwise. The most relevant di↵erence is that the growth in the number of players produces a larger PD region, for ( 1 n + ↵, ↵ + ) is the parametric interval of in which the dilemma applies. This makes the PD problem of the VWG particularly relevant in global consumer markets.
The Experimental design
The companion paper investigates players' choices in a VWG with or without a redistribution mechanism transferring money from defectors to cooperators. In the base (no redistribution) version a group of 10 players are asked to choose between two goods for 10 rounds. The share of players choosing each good is the only information revealed to all players at the end of each round. The two goods are named A and B: the first costs 10 tokens, the second 5 tokens. In each round players are given an endowment of 20 tokens. There is a benefit of 3 tokens for each participant whenever a player chooses the more expensive good A (see Table A1 in the Appendix). This version of the game is specifically designed to reproduce the main characteristics of the VWG, including the positive externality in purchasing the responsible but more expensive good. The experiment's payo↵s structure involves a free-riding problem, because the dominant strategy in the base treatment is represented by purchasing the cheaper but less responsible good B whatever the share of players choosing good A (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
In the 'redistribution phase' of the treatment, a balanced budget redistributive mechanism is introduced in each of the remaining 10 rounds, with all players choosing product B being taxed of 2.5 points that are conveyed to a common fund 2 . The collected points are then redistributed before the following round among players who have previously chosen the good A. Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix describe this second version of the game. It comes along that, in the redistribution phase, the purchase of good A becomes the dominant strategy, whatever the number of cooperative players.
In parallel treatments, two framed versions of the base and redistribution phase described above are added. More specifically, the two goods are itemized as two 'electricity supply contracts' provided by two companies: good A is sold by a 'socially responsible company', while good B by a second unspecified company.
In the two frames, social responsibility is presented as concerning two di↵er-ent 'areas of commitment'. Frame 1 sees the company's dedication to the local development of the economy, while Frame 2 describes the company's 'pledge' to fund social innovations initiatives and projects on a national scale. The idea behind these two versions of the game is to di↵erentiate the possible indirect impact that players may have from the socially responsible activities of the company. The larger the distance, the lower the potential benefit for the player.
The di↵erent treatments vary as well in the order of phases's sequence. To sum up, the VWG experiment includes the following treatments: i) baseredistribution, ii) frame 1 base-frame 1 redistribution and iii) frame 2 baseframe 2 redistribution, and their corresponding inverted sequences. (see Table  A5 in the Appendix).
In each treatment we ask players to engage in 10 rounds of the basic (framed or not framed) game, followed by 10 rounds of the (framed or not framed) redistribution game (or in inverted sequence), asking them to fill in a questionnaire in the end.
A nice property when investigating the VWG in a lab experiment is that the latter solely focuses on the e↵ects of price and public good characteristics, while controlling for any other contingent factor a↵ecting consumers' choices in real life.
The application of the theoretical framework described in section 3 to the parametric case of the base version of the game implies that n = 10, 1 10 = 30, = 5 (where = C vR C vC is the cost di↵erential between the two strategies), and ↵ = 0. Consequently, the payo↵ function becomes
where j is the number of players performing the vR in S . In addition to this, it is taken into account that a plausible explanation for a nonzero share of cooperators is given by the presence of other-regarding preferences. Given what said above, from inspection of Table A2 it is clear that players can find optimal the vR strategy in no redistribution treatments only in case of ↵ > 2. A comparison between the basic and the framed version of the game also makes it possible to check whether the average share of co-operators is a↵ected by other components of players' other-regarding preferences, eventually elicited by the frame. The main findings of who analyze revealed choices in the experiments are: i) the non zero but declining share of cooperators in the base (framed and non framed) treatments; ii) the upward jump in the share of cooperators once the redistribution mechanism is introduced; iii) the positive e↵ect of the frame on the share of cooperative choices in non redistribution treatments. In what follows we analyze the determinants of satisfaction (for the game, for one's own and other players' behavior in the game) and how the combination of revealed choices and stated satisfaction may help us to outline a broader theoretical foundation of the utility function which adequately explains empirical evidence from both sources. 
Empirical findings on satisfaction about the experiment
We start our analysis with a description of the share of cooperative choices of experiment participants and of the average group choice of the ten participants to each session. In the first case we observe the presence of a share (14 percent) of unconditional cooperators (who always choose to buy the responsible product whatever the treatment and the information received on the number of cooperators in the previous rounds) against only one unconditional non cooperator (always choosing to buy the standard product) ( Figure 1 ). All the other players are between these two extremes and change their strategy during the experiment, with the sample median value being exactly at 50 percent of cooperative choices.
In order to measure satisfaction about the experiment and about one's own and other players' behavior we use the standard 0-10 life satisfaction scale. We further define as strong (weak) cooperators those with a share of cooperative choices above (below) sample median and find that the overall level of satisfac-tion about the experiment is slightly higher for weak than for strong cooperators (8.10 against 7.73) (Figure 2a ). The distance is much more marked when looking at satisfaction for the other players' behavior, which is significantly lower for strong cooperators (5.12 against 6.75, with 95% confidence intervals that do not overlap) (Figure 2b ). The level of satisfaction about one's own behavior in the experiment is extremely close and not significantly di↵erent in the two groups ( Figure 2c) .
In order to test whether game outcomes a↵ect the three satisfaction variables we estimate the following ordered logit specification:
where Satisf action is one of the three satisfaction variables that we in turn consider as dependent variable in our estimates (for the experiment, for one's own behavior in the experiment, for other players' behavior in the experiment). The main regressors of interest are P layerNonCoopChoiceShare (the share of non cooperative choices -product B -of the i -th player across the 20 rounds) and AvgGroupN onCoopChoiceShare (the share of group non cooperative choicesproduct B -considering all the ten players across the 20 rounds). We further add socio-demographic controls to the estimate such as age, gender and income classes.
We estimate the specification separately for the subsample of weak and strong cooperators. When we estimate the specification for the subsample of weak cooperators, we find that strong cooperators are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to the their share of cooperative choices (see Table 1 , column 1). It is as well important that in the regression this e↵ect is net of the impact of the average players' behavior, thereby not mixing up with a disappointment for the other players' non-cooperative choice. The above mentioned finding implies that, whatever the average level of group cooperation in the game, a marginal increase in one's own cooperation increases one's own satisfaction for the game. In terms of economic significance our coe cient implies that a (forced) 'radical' move of strong cooperators from unconditional cooperation to unconditional non-cooperation (0 to 100 percent cooperative choices) would produce a reduction of 56 percent in the probability of registering the highest level of satisfaction about the experiment for strong cooperators. and indicate that a player's move from unconditional non cooperation to unconditional cooperation (from 0 to 100 percent cooperative choices) would reduce the probability of achieving the maximum level of satisfaction for other players' behavior by 10 percent, while the same 100 percent reduction of average group cooperative choices in the game would reduce the probability that strong cooperators achieve the maximum level of satisfaction about other players behavior by 15 percent. The likely explanation of the combined finding is that cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma is a joint endeavor which leaves more disappointment the stronger the one's own cooperative e↵ort, on one side, and the lower the cooperative response, on the other side.
The third specification shows that satisfaction of strong cooperators for their own behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their cooperative choices (see Table 1 , column 5). Again, this e↵ect is calculated after controlling for the average players' behavior in the game hence implying that, whatever the average level of cooperation in the game, a marginal increase in cooperative behaviour of strong cooperators increases the satisfaction for their own behavior in the game. In terms of magnitude, the move from unconditional cooperation to unconditional non-cooperation would produce for them a 72 percent lower probability of declaring the highest level of satisfaction for personal behavior (or, to consider a smaller variation, a reduction by 0.1 in the share of cooperative choices in the game would reduce by 7.2 percent the same probability).
All these e↵ects found for strong cooperators disappear in participants who cooperated below the median (weak cooperators). For this subsample of participants satisfaction (about the game, about their own and other players' behavior) does not depend on observables (see Table 1 , columns 2, 4 and 6). This di↵er-ence between strong and weak cooperators is a strong indication of heterogeneity in behaviour and preferences among experiment participants.
A first robustness check of our main findings consists in a unique estimate where we use the standard PlayerNonCoopChoiceShare and AvgGroupNonCoopChoiceShare variables as regressors and test heterogeneity of preferences with two slope dummies. More specifically, the two variables above are interacted with a dummy taking the value of one for weak cooperators and zero otherwise (the PlayerNonCoopChoiceShareDWeak and vgGroupNonCoopChoiceShareDWeak added regressors). 4 The first estimate confirms findings from separate estimates since the share of non cooperative choices is negative and significant on the dependent variable (satisfaction from the game), while the dummy for weak cooperators produces a significant and opposite e↵ect, thereby confirming that the share of their cooperative/non cooperative choices does not a↵ect their satisfaction with the experiment (Table 2 , column 1). In terms of economic significance the estimated probability of the e↵ect of a 100 increase in non cooperative choices for strong cooperators on the probability that they declare the highest level of satisfaction for the experiment is quite close to what found in the separate estimate (59 percent).
The second estimate confirms that strong cooperators' satisfaction about other players' behavior in the experiment depends on the share of their cooperative choices and the average share of cooperative choices of other players in the experiments ( Table 2 , column 2). The impact of a 100 percent change in these two variables has e↵ects similar to those calculated in the separate estimates (20 and 28 percent respectively). However in this case dummies testing for a di↵erence in preferences of weak cooperators have the right sign but are not significant. This result partially di↵ers from the observed lack of significance of the same regressors in the separate estimate of weak cooperators and indicates that, while the other regarding preference component is strongly di↵erent between strong and weak cooperators, negative reciprocity is in part common in both, even though stronger for strong cooperators when we use a unique estimate incorporating the restriction of equal coe cients for all other regressors.
The third estimate confirms that satisfaction about personal behavior in the experiment grows for strong cooperators in the share of their cooperative (non cooperative) choices, while this is not the case for weak cooperators ( Table  2 , column 3). In terms of magnitude, a 100 percent move from unconditional cooperation to unconditional non cooperation would reduce by 64 percent the probability that strong cooperators declare the maximum satisfaction about their behavior in the game.
A further important check is to verify that our significant e↵ects are robust to the introduction of average individual profits as controls. To this purpose we calculate players' profits in each round and average them. The variable is then introduced in our three base estimates. The significance of our main regressors remains both in subsample estimates and in full sample estimates where we test for the heterogeneity of players' satisfaction with slope dummies (Table 3 ).
An alternative specification for the regression on the determinants of satisfaction with other players' behavior (the regression where we have conflicting results between the unique regression and subsample estimates for weak and strong cooperators) consists in creating a synthetic negative reciprocity variable calculated as the ratio of one's own average and other players' average cooperative choice. The ratio ranges from zero (unconditional cooperators have zero numerator of their non cooperative choices) to three (the maximum ratio between one's own non cooperative choices and the average non cooperative choices of the 10 player group). This variable aims to capture a final general sensation at end experiment of the distance between players' cooperative e↵ort and that of their peers. The significance of our synthetic negative reciprocity variable is strong and robust to the introduction of the profit variable (Table 4 , columns 1 and 2). In terms of magnitude a one point change fall in the variable produces a 7 percent fall in satisfaction about other players' behavior. This finding is particularly important since we could expect some correlation between the two. The way we constructed them, however, reduces such correlation as far as we can (.48). This is because profits in each round depend not just on the above mentioned average distance in the game between players' cooperative e↵ort and that of their peers, but as well by the di↵erences in the ratio between player's and average cooperative choices in each round and by the presence/absence of the redistribution mechanism which weakens the correlation between negative reciprocity and profits.
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A main characteristic of the game is that players' monetary payo↵s grow, when selecting the non-cooperative choice in the baseline treatment (no-redistribution) (whatever the share of cooperators), while falling in the non-cooperative choice in the redistribution treatment (whatever the share of cooperators). We therefore take into account these di↵erent characteristics and isolate in a further estimate choices made in rounds with/without redistribution. The new estimates show that satisfaction of strong cooperators with the experiment, as well as with their behavior, falls in non-cooperative choices even when we consider only choices in the no-redistribution treatments (significance of the N oRedAvgP layerChoice in Table 5 column 2). The relevance of this result is that it provides strong empirical evidence for the existence of an other-regarding preference component. This is because, for the subsample of strong cooperators, it reveals the anomaly of satisfaction for a personal behavior that grows with an action -cooperating in no-redistribution treatments -which clearly reduces their monetary payo↵s. We have such evidence from the combination of experimental choices (revealed preferences) and self-reported satisfaction (stated preferences).
The significant point of this result is that it provides strong empirical evidence for the existence of an other-regarding preference component. We have such evidence from the combination of experimental choices (revealed preferences) in and self-declared satisfaction (stated preferences). Indeed, for the subsample of strong cooperators, it reveals the anomaly of satisfaction for a personal behavior that grows with an action -cooperating in redistribution treatments -which clearly reduces their monetary payo↵s.
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Results from stated preferences, di↵erently from those from lab (or field) experiments, are subject to endogeneity problems since there may always be an unobserved third variable that can directly cause our two relevant variables 5 A further robustness check for our findings consists in changing the threshold that divides strong and weak cooperators. More specifically, we look at percentiles close to the median but higher or lower than it. If we move down the threshold between strong and weak cooperators from .50 to .45, we still have all our main findings. The result in the satisfaction for the experiment regression is no more significant with thresholds moved down to .40 or .35 (that is, by broadening and enlarging the category of strong cooperators). The same lack of significance for this result occurs when we move the threshold up to .55 and .60 (reducing the number and creating more severe thresholds for strong cooperation). Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 6 A possible interpretation for the other-regarding component identified by our findings may be that players' satisfaction for their cooperative choice depends on the generativeness of their act, that is, by the fact that the act positively contributes to the public good component and to the total payo↵. On this line Becchetti and Degli Antoni (2010) find that the amount sent by trustors in a randomized trust game experiment is significantly and positively correlated with revealed satisfaction after the experiment but not before it.
(one's own or other players choices in the game and satisfaction about game circumstances), thereby explaining their 'spurious' correlation. However the pattern of determinants of satisfactions about game outcome and players' game behaviour (and not merely satisfaction about life) is too consistent with the direct causality story to make the endogeneity hypothesis implausible. Consider a parallel with dating in love a↵airs. A lover may try (and fail) to meet her/his mate through several proposed dates. The pattern of correlations we would expect in that case would very close to what we find here with satisfaction about other players' behaviour in the game which is lower the higher one's own e↵ort and the lower the cooperative response of other players. What other explanation could we give than direct causality to the love a↵air and, in parallel, to our story ? To reinforce our argument in the experiment we have the advantage of full anonymity among experiment participants, di↵erently from the love a↵air example where we have a full relational history. Hence the only characteristics that a given player knows about their experiment mates is their cooperative/noncooperative choices and there are no other known factors on which she/he can base her/his satisfaction about them (and especially about their behaviour in the game). Back to our other main result, for what other reasons 'tribes of strong cooperators' can be happy about their cooperative choices in the game beyond satisfaction of their preferences? Imagine a Kantian value trait which causes both strong cooperation and satisfaction when one cooperates. Isn't it exactly the other-regarding preference component of our model? We might for absurd assume that the act of cooperating does not contribute by itself to satisfaction about one's own behavior in the game and that it is the Kantian factor that makes people cooperate and feel happy about one's own behaviour in the game. Again our model (presented in details in the next section) would be a consistent description of what we find. In terms of policy conclusions our model helps us to understand that types are heterogeneous and that virtuous matching (cooperative types playing only with cooperative types) would significantly increase total payo↵ in the game (this independently of the endogeneity issue) and satisfaction about game circumstances in the specific case of satisfaction for other players' behaviour. 7 
The broader utility function
In this section, we outline a model that can replicate the main characteristics of the observed empirical, experimental findings combined with those of revealed satisfaction about the experiment and one's own and other players' behaviour.
More specifically, the model must be able to produce: i) a nonzero but declining share of cooperative choices (the experimental finding of Becchetti et al. 2015)); ii) satisfaction for the game of strong cooperators increasing in proportion to their cooperative choice; iii) satisfaction of strong cooperators for other players' behavior negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and of the non cooperative behavior of the latter; iv) satisfaction of strong cooperators for their own behavior in the game depending in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices; v) none of the e↵ects at points iii)-v) for weak cooperators.
In order to sketch a theoretical framework which can mimic all these characteristics we write the following instantaneous (experiment round) function:
The function presents three di↵erences with respect to the standard utility function of vote with the wallet game in (1) . First, we assume that other-regarding preferences have heterogeneous weight on the utility of players in the experiment (with ↵ i being extracted from an unknown distribution with zero lower bound). Second, we assume that there exists a negative reciprocity argument (✓ i ) in the utility function whose impact depends on the previous round share of non cooperating participants on total participants.
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The impact of the negative reciprocity argument is as well player specific. Both of the two arguments apply only when the player selects the vR strategy, while they are zero when she/he selects the vC strategy (there cannot be satisfaction of other-regarding preferences and negative reciprocity e↵ect when the players choose the non cooperative strategy). Third, we assume that each player has her/his own expectation E it (j) on the number j of cooperative plays in her/his group except herself/himself (which of course depends on expectations about the weight of other-regarding preferences and reciprocity arguments of the other players).
When considering the base (no redistribution) treatment of the game the utility function specified above can produce i) Unconditional cooperators for very high values of the other-regarding preference component or:
that is, unconditional cooperators cooperate also when all other players do not, since the weight of their other-regarding component is so high to compensate that of the reciprocity component (even under the most pessimistic 8 Reciprocity assumes that agents are willing to sacrifice part of their material wealth in order to be kind (unkind) to someone who has been kind (unkind) to them (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) . Our argument actually measures a disutility proportional to the share of other players that have not cooperated. As we will see in what follows in our case this argument which grows in the share of previous period non cooperators may determine a switch to the non cooperative choice by making utility (but not monetary payo↵s per se) from the cooperative choice lower than that from the non cooperative choice. On the other hand,in the redistribution treatment this switch implies indeed a sacrifice in terms of material wealth (thereby producing a negative reciprocity e↵ect fully consistent with the above mentioned definition) provided that players have not observed in the previous period an increase in the share of cooperators vis--vis the previous round.
assumption about the share of cooperative plays formulated above where j = 0) and the extra cost of buying responsibly.
ii) Conditional cooperators with the above inequality which may hold given a certain expectation E it (j) on the number of cooperating players and a given number of actual cooperating players in the previous round in their experiment session
but where the inequality may be reversed thereby leading to the non cooperative choice if the expectation on the number of cooperators falls.
iii) Unconditional non cooperators who have ↵ i = 0 and therefore find it always optimal not to cooperate.
The e↵ect of the socially responsible frame (ie. frame 1) may be that of adding an extra component (f 1i ) to the other-regarding preference factor (and eventually to the reciprocity factor as well) thereby explaining the jump in cooperative choices.
The e↵ect of the redistribution mechanism further changes the model since we know that it makes strictly convenient to choose the cooperative strategies even in absence of other-regarding preferences given experiment parameters.
The utility function in presence of the redistribution mechanism in the treatment without frames becomes
A main di↵erence here is that the cooperative choice becomes the dominant strategy.
It is as well reasonable to assume that satisfaction for other players' behavior concerns only components for which other players matter, that is (in the base treatment)
which is clearly increasing in one's own cooperative choice and decreasing in other players' non cooperative behavior.
Based on our model we can say that a) the share of cooperators in the first round of the base version of the game coincides with the share of players having ↵ i > 2 since the reciprocity argument cannot a↵ect their choices;
b) the first round di↵erence in the share of cooperators in frames 1 and 2 with those in the base treatment is given by players with
, that is, players in which the frame activates an additional other-regarding component inverting the inequality;
c) the time decay in the share of cooperators in the no redistribution treatment depends on the reciprocity parameter since, without reciprocity component, even when discovering that some players did not cooperate at time 1, cooperators should continue to cooperate in the no redistribution treatment where non cooperation is the dominant strategy and the relative convenience of the cooperation vs non cooperation strategy does not change in the number of group cooperators. Hence in no redistribution treatments cooperators would find it optimal to continue to cooperate given their other-regarding preferences but they stop doing so because cooperation produces, due to the negative reciprocity argument, a disutility that grows in propoportion to the share of non cooperators. The possibility of isolating this reciprocity component is a nice property of our game since the payo↵ di↵erence between choosing to cooperate or not in no redistribution treatments does not depend on the number of cooperators;
d) The decay in the share of cooperators in the redistribution treatment is even more akin to a negative reciprocity e↵ect since cooperation is here the dominant strategy and the switch to non cooperation for cooperators reduces monetary payo↵s (while it reduces utility -net of the reciprocity e↵ect -but not monetary payo↵s for them in the no redistribution treatments). Note as well that, if the cooperator has a negative surprise in terms of information on the share of previous period cooperators this further reduces its payo↵ in case of switch to non cooperation given the redistribution mechanism, provided that players have not observed in the previous period an increase in the share of cooperators vis--vis the previous round. We may define this a pure negative reciprocity e↵ect (I observe an unkind behavior from other players and I reciprocate the unkind behaviour even if it reduces my monetary payo↵s) while we may define that under c) an impure negative reciprocity e↵ect (I reciprocate the unkind behaviour even if it reduces my utility but not my monetary payo↵) e) upward jumps in the share of cooperators within non redistribution treatments cannot be explained by this model (and could be eventually ac-counted for by adding random disturbances which capture for irrationality or cognitive biases);
To sum up, the combination of revealed experimental choices and declared satisfaction with the game and players' behavior produces two important results, highlighted by the broader utility function model. First, a subset of players must have an other-regarding preference component since they choose even in the first round to buy the responsible product even if it costs more. Second, (some of the) players must have a reciprocity argument since they switch from the cooperative to the non cooperative strategy when receiving information on the number of cooperators even though such choice reduces their monetary payo↵ in redistribution treatment and their utility -net of the reciprocity e↵ect -in no redistribution treatments.
Conclusions
Our paper is an example of how two sources of information -incentivized revealed choices in experiments and self-declared satisfaction about game circumstances -can usefully complement each other. We start with an original hybrid contribution multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called 'Vote-with-the-Wallet Game'. Results of a nonzero and declining share of cooperators departing from the Nash equilibrium are supplemented by survey data on satisfaction about game circumstances. The latter show that the subset of strong cooperators (those with a share of cooperating choices above sample average) are significantly less satisfied with the game and their behavior in the game, the lower the share of their cooperative choices. In addition to it, strong cooperators are as well significantly less satisfied with the behavior of their experiment mates the more the latter do not cooperate, and the stronger they cooperate. Other interesting findings are that some players; i) cooperate in the first round of the game even though this reduces their own monetary payo↵s; ii) switch from cooperation to non cooperation when knowing the number of players who cooperated/ not cooperated in the previous round even though this choice reduces their own monetary payo↵s. Our econometric estimates document that our findings are robust to several controls and the inclusion of the average profit per round. The two most important findings of our paper are consistent with our theoretical framework assuming that a subset of players has other-regarding preferences, as well as a reciprocity argument in their utility function. We conclude our analysis by proposing a broader utility function which includes three original arguments which vary for each participant: i) expectations on the number of cooperating players; ii) an other-regarding preference component; iii) a reciprocity component. The inclusion of these three arguments accounts for most of the observed choices in the game. Tables   Table 1: The e↵ect of one's own and group non cooperation on satisfactionseparate strong and weak cooperator estimates Table 6 . Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001 Table 6 . Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001 Table 3 : The e↵ect of one's own and group non cooperation on satisfaction -separate and joint estimates controlling for player's payo↵s Dependent variable: satisfaction about other players' behaviour. Legend for regressors: see Table 6 . Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001 Table 5 : The e↵ects of one's own and group cooperation in di↵erent treatments on satisfaction about the experiment and one's own behaviour in the game Table 6 . Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001 Table 6 : Legend of Tables   Variable  Description  PlayerNonCoopChoiceSharee  Share of Share of players' cooperating choices (choices of product B) in the 20 experiment rounds multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one for rounds in no redistribution treatments, multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one if the player is a weak cooperator (has a share of cooperative choices below median) NoRedAvgGroupNonCoopChoiceShareDWeak Average share of cooperating choices (choices of product B) of all the 10 players in the 20 experiment rounds in a given session multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one for rounds in no redistribution treatments, multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one if the player is a weak cooperator (has a share of cooperative choices below median) RedPlayerNonCoopChoiceShareDWeak Share of player's cooperating choices (choices of product B) in the 20 experiment rounds multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one for rounds in redistribution treatments, multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one if the player is a weak cooperator (has a share of cooperative choices below median) RedAvgGroupNonCoopChoiceShareDWeak Average share of cooperating choices (choices of product B) of all the 10 players in the 20 experiment rounds in a given session multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one for rounds in redistribution treatments, multiplied for a 0/1 dummy taking value one if the player is a weak cooperator (has a share of cooperative choices below median) 
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